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F rom June 28 to July 8,  2018,  heavy rains fell in western Japan.  In July,  the total rainfall in all of 
western Japan was two to four times the monthly aver-
age,  and some areas were hit with > 1,000 mm of rain.  
At least 225 people died because of flash flooding and 
landslides triggered by the torrential rainfall.  Flooding 
occurred in the Mabi area in Kurashiki City,  Okayama 
Prefecture,  due mainly to the collapse of the Oda River’s 
embankments; 51 people died and 5,600 houses were 
destroyed.  The only hospital in the region,  Mabi 
Memorial Hospital,  required a complete evacuation in 
the disaster.  The evacuation was conducted with the 
cooperation of the Japanese Disaster Medical Assistance 
Team (DMAT),  the non-governmental organization 
(NGO) Peace Winds Japan (PWJ) Rescue,  and the Self-
Defense Force (SDF).  Hospital evacuation is a rare 
event,  but many hospitals have had to be evacuated due 
to earthquakes,  flooding,  and hazardous material spills;  
these evacuations were officially performed using public 
resources [1-3].  Here we provide the details of a com-
plete hospital evacuation accomplished with collabora-
tion between a Japanese NGO and the DMAT and SDF.
A hospital evacuation is a complicated process.  
Factors to consider during a hospital evacuation include 
much more than the immediate functional loss of cru-
cial health services such as operating rooms,  emergency 
departments,  laboratories,  intensive care units,  reha-
bilitation facilities,  and pharmacies [4].  This report 
describes the planning,  modulation,  and procedure of 
evacuating hospital patients.  The ensuing discharge and 
care of patients,  treatment of injuries,  and incident 
command are addressed.  Sharing this experience may 
help other hospitals develop hospital evacuation assis-
tance plans.
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During major flooding in June/July 2018,  the Mabi Memorial Hospital in Kurashiki,  Okayama,  Japan was 
flooded and patients were stranded in the hospital.  Peace Winds Japan,  a non-governmental organization,  col-
laborated with the Japanese Disaster Medical Assistance Team and Self-Defense Force Public to transport 8 
critical patients from the hospital by helicopter.  Ultimately,  54 patients and hospital staff members were safely 
evacuated.  The evacuation was accomplished without any casualties,  despite the severe conditions.  Public and 
private organizations can work together and continue to seek ways to collaborate and cooperate in disaster set-
tings.
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Report
Setting. Mabi Memorial Hospital is a private 
hospital with 80 adult beds and 23 dialyzers.  It is the 
only general hospital in the Mabi area.  Almost all of the 
hospital’s inpatients are elderly and non-ambulatory due 
to frailty,  reflecting Japan’s super-aging society.  The 
hospital is four stories high and located 800 meters 
north of the Oda River,  which had collapsed from the 
heavy rain.  As shown in the disaster map,  the sur-
rounding area is lowland,  which subsequently flooded 
(Fig. 1).
The evacuation of the hospitalized patients was nec-
essary due to the loss of water,  electric,  and sewage 
services.  The arrival of external assistance was delayed 
because the hospital was completely surrounded by 
water and could not be accessed by land.  In addition,  
the hospital’s evacuation request was not received amid 
the confusion of the disaster information.
Flooding. The rainfall that caused the flooding 
was unusually powerful with the potential to cause ter-
rible damage.  From midnight on July 6 to the early 
morning of July 7,  2018,  the rainfall caused the col-
lapse of the embankments of the Oda River,  and the 
Mabi area was subjected to flash flooding.  At 5 : 00 am 
on July 7,  emergency requests from area residents to 
firefighters peaked at 183 per hour.  At 7 : 40 am,  the 
immersion of Mabi Memorial Hospital began,  and 
around 8 : 30 am,  the supply of electricity and water 
stopped.  Emergency generators failed.  At that time,  76 
patients and 31 hospital staff members were in the hos-
pital,  and many surrounding residents had also evacu-
ated to the hospital.  A total of over 300 people were 
obliged to stay overnight in the hospital,  where access 
to critical services was interrupted.
July is Japan’s summer season,  and western Japan 
was also suffering from heat waves,  with the maximum 
temperature exceeding 40°C at that time.  As a result,  
360 Inaba et al. Acta Med.  Okayama　Vol.  74,  No.  4
Fig. 1　 The Oda River flowing into the Mabi area,  and the location of Mabi Memorial Hospital.  (Modified map created by the Geospatial 
Information Authority of Japan [D1-No.919])
elderly patients were even more debilitated in the hospi-
tal,  where air conditioners could not be used because of 
the power failure.  The hospital was thrown into dark-
ness and patient records were not available because the 
computer system was down.  Around mid-day,  the 
maximum flood depth reached 5.38 meters and the 
flooded area reached approximately 1,200 hectares.
Evacuation assistance
1. Contribution of the DMAT and the government
The Japan DMAT program was set up in 2001 by the 
Ministry of Health,  Labor and Welfare (MHLW) based 
on the lessons learned from the Great Hanshin-Awaji 
earthquake in 1995.  DMATs were defined as trained,  
mobile,  self-contained medical teams that can act in the 
acute phase of disasters (48-72 hr after their occurrence) 
such as major earthquakes,  plane crashes,  and railway 
accidents to provide medical treatment in affected areas,  
and the MHLW directed prefectural health depart-
ments to include the promotion of training of DMAT 
personnel in their local disaster management plans.  
DMATs experienced hospital evacuations during the 
Kumamoto earthquake,  but there have been no reports 
of cooperation with private resources such as NGOs.  
On the morning of July 7,  government officers and 
some DMAT coordinators set up Okayama Prefecture 
Medical Headquarters (OPMH),  which included 
DMAT Adjustment Headquarters,  in the Okayama 
Prefectural government office.  The OPMH prepared to 
follow up with Mabi Memorial 
Hospital after receiving information 
from the hospital that “hospital evac-
uation is currently unnecessary” on 
the morning of July 7.  However,  it 
became impossible to contact the hos-
pital in the afternoon,  and the OPMH 
thus considered dispatching a DMAT 
to assess the situation.  Because the 
headquarters of the DMAT did not 
reach an agreement over safety con-
cerns about dispatching to flooded 
hospitals,  the OPMH gave up the plan 
to dispatch a DMAT at that time.  
Officials at the Okayama Prefecture 
governmental offices were also 
unaware of the need for a hospital 
evacuation since they had not received 
evacuation requests from the hospital 
at that time and had received only the previous infor-
mation provided by the hospital.
The next afternoon (July 8),  following information 
from the NGO medical team,  a DMAT was dispatched 
to relief tents set up by the city’s Fire Department.  The 
DMAT cooperated with Fire Department emergency 
services to take care patients that the NGO and SDF had 
brought from the hospital by boats and trucks and 
adjusted the patients’ transfers to appropriate hospitals 
(Fig. 2).
2. Contribution of the NGO, Peace Winds Japan
At 9 : 30 am on July 8,  the NGO PWJ Rescue and 
medical teams reached the Mabi area in Kurashiki City.  
The PWJ is a Japanese NGO that provides search-and-
rescue and medical teams in conjunction with public 
organizations.  They have not only a medical team but 
also an aviation team with resources including two heli-
copters and a maritime team with resources including 
amphibious cars.  Initially,  PWJ Rescue planned to res-
cue and treat the city’s residents left behind at home.  
When they reached Kurashiki City on the morning of 
July 8,  one of the personnel at the OPMH asked a PWJ 
physician to assess and obtain information inside of 
Mabi Memorial Hospital.  Because PWJ Rescue had 
maritime rescue equipment,  they were able to safely 
reach the flooded hospital using amphibious cars,  until 
11 : 30 am (Fig. 3).
When the PWJ medical team got into the hospital,  
the incident command system was not working well.  
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Fig. 2　 Patient transfer from the NGO physician to the DMAT.
Non-ambulatory 44 patients were left in the hospital 
despite the evacuation of surrounding residents and 
ambulatory patients by SDF boats; almost all of the 
patients left behind were elderly,  frail patients (Table 1).  
The temperature was above 30°C in the hospital,  and it 
was anticipated that the elderly patients would face 
life-threatening conditions without electricity and water.  
The hospital staff and SDF were burdened with figuring 
out how to evacuate the non-ambulatory patients.  The 
PWJ physician discussed the situation with the hospital 
director,  procured a transport method,  and proceeded 
to triage patients for transportation.  In addition,  since 
all of the patients left behind needed continued hospi-
talization,  Okayama University Hospital was asked to 
accept patients,  and the PWJ medical team’s helicopters 
transferred 8 patients there directly (Fig. 4).
Next,  11 patients were transported to the nearest 
shoreline by boats (Fig. 5); 35 patients were trans-
ported by the SDF trucks to where the DMAT was wait-
ing,  for further transportation.  Finally,  at 8 : 30 pm,  
54 patients had been successfully and safely evacuated.  
The operation’s success was a result of the cooperation 
between the NGO,  a DMAT,  and the SDF.
Discussion
Considering these successful results,  it is meaning-
ful that this hospital evacuation could be accomplished 
under such severe conditions,  without injuries or mor-
talities.  It is also notable that this is the first case in 
which an NGO,  a DMAT,  and the SDF collaborated for 
a hospital evacuation.  The medical assistance teams 
struggled with the decision to evacuate the hospital.  
The NGO,  the DMAT,  and the SDF collaborated to 
successfully execute the hospital’s evacuation,  trans-
porting all patients without any victims.
The first factor to consider in this evacuation was the 
decision to dispatch the medical assistance team into the 
flooded hospital.  On the morning of 
July 7,  the OPMH did not dispatch 
medical teams,  as they believed the 
hospital’s initial “evacuation is unnec-
essary” message to be true.  The deci-
sion to evacuate a hospital is difficult;  
an unnecessary evacuation subjects 
the hospital’s patients to otherwise 
avoidable risks and is costly for the 
hospital [5].  Decision-makers must 
weigh the risks,  uncertainty,  costs,  
and shrinking time window for evac-
uations [6].  In retrospect,  in this case 
the OPMH should have dispatched 
the DMAT to assist with decision- 
making and share correct information 
from inside the hospital.  NGOs have 
supported the decision for hospital 
evacuations in such difficult circum-
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Table 1　 Patient characteristics
Characteristics n=54






　Chronic renal failure 9 (16.7%)
　Congestive heart failure 5 (9.3%)
　Respiratory disorder 9 (16.7%)
　Musculoskeletal disease 16 (30.0%)
　Malignant disease 6 (11.1%)







Fig. 3　 The NGO team reached the flooded hospital by amphibious cars.
stances.
The second factor to consider is the triage of 
patients.  Generally,  in triage we prioritize critical 
patients; however,  in a hospital evacuation,  it is diffi-
cult to evacuate patients according to these priorities.  
Schultz [4] proposes that triage effectiveness varies 
depending on the scenario.  As in this case,  a hospital’s 
evacuation depends on evacuation resources.  It was 
fortunate that in this scenario we 
could quickly use the NGO’s helicop-
ters for patients with serious condi-
tions,  but the process still took a long 
time.  Evacuation was first started 
using a PWJ boat,  which was avail-
able immediately,  and we began 
transporting patients who were 
ambulatory,  but less critical.  The 
Hospital Evacuation Decision Guide 
[7] states that pairing patients with 
appropriately trained staff and proper 
transportation resources is more 
important than evacuating the sickest 
patients first,  because of the dangers 
that come with moving these very frail 
patients.
Finally,  communication problems 
should be discussed.  Inadequate 
communication is a serious problem 
during disasters,  and two aspects of 
communication problems should be 
addressed.  One aspect is the prob-
lems caused by unusable electronic 
equipment,  including telecommuni-
cations,  and the other is the difficul-
ties in disseminating information 
among the assisting organizations.
The loss of essential telecommuni-
cations systems and health informa-
tion technology will,  at the very least,  
seriously reduce a hospital’s ability to 
efficiently care for patients [7].  Due to 
the severe flooding,  Mabi Memorial 
Hospital had no power and the emer-
gency generator broke down after 
being inundated.  Since not all of the 
electrical and electronic devices in the 
hospital could be used and since the 
patient records were electronic,  a 
great deal of effort was expended simply to get the 
patient information that was necessary for the patients’ 
evacuation.
The NGO collaborated with the DMAT and the SDF 
for the hospital’s evacuation,  but we faced many chal-
lenges based on the communication problems among 
these entities.  For example,  it was impossible to share 
information on the NGO,  DMAT,  and SDF operations 
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Fig. 4　 Patient transport from the hospital rooftop via the PWJʼs helicopter.
Fig. 5　 Patients transport by SDF boats.
among the organizations.  Japan’s DMAT program uses 
an Internet-based Emergency Medical Information 
System (EMIS) to share information on hospital disas-
ters and DMAT activities.  While the EMIS has been a 
very significant medical data sharing mechanism during 
disasters in Japan [8],  only one PWJ physician and no 
SDF members could access the EMIS.  Next,  even 
though the SDF headquarters and OPMH were in the 
Okayama prefectural government office building,  they 
were on different floors,  making it difficult to share 
information with one another.  The PWJ medical team,  
which provided the only medical assistance from out-
side the hospital,  greatly assisted the hospital staff and 
triage patients with the selection and provision of 
appropriate transport resources.  However,  the PWJ 
medical team could not share enough information with 
the DMAT team outside the hospital.
To address these problems,  we are planning to build 
a cooperative pre-disaster system which will include 
efforts such as a joint drill using each resource.  Natural 
disasters are generally recurrent and unpredictable 
events that require integrated policies and the combined 
efforts of all of the local groups including NGOs,  
national-level,  and international-level authorities.
Conclusion
We reported hospital evacuation assistance from an 
NGO,  a DMAT,  and the SDF during the 2018 western 
Japan flood.  Japan is one of the most disaster-prone 
countries in the world.  The NGO,  DMAT,  and SDF 
collaborated to safely and successfully evacuate > 50 
patients from a flooded hospital.  Disaster response 
recoveries require coordinated efforts between various 
public and private entities including non-governmental 
organizations in order to be effective.  Planning must 
involve everyone from these various sectors to ensure 
coordinated response and recovery efforts.
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